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Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens

Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens

 AKA: TERRORIST SANCTUARY’S

THIS IS Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

OF THE “COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM” THE  407 PAGE DOCUMENT AS PROVIDED TO PRESIDENT TRUMP, HIS APPOINTED AND THE FULL CONGRESS, BY THE DEPT. OF STATE 

Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (PDF)

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Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the term “TERRORIST SANCTUARY” or “SANCTUARY” excludes the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a determination under section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to Title 50; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22–

The focus of this posting on my website is what President Trump knows, what some federal, state, elected representative, and appointed judges CHOOSE TO IGNORE and what American citizen should know.

 WHO KNEW, KNOWS AND CARES? ABOUT  INDIGENOUS NATIVES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS “EXTENDING OR OPERATING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES? 

 WHO KNEW, KNOWS AND CARES? ABOUT THE POROUS BORDERS, THE TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS, AKA “TERRORIST SANCTUARY” THAT THREATEN THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF AMERICA’S HOMELAND

 WHO KNEW, KNOWS AND CARES?

PRESIDENT DONALD. J. TRUMP, HIS APPOINTEES , THE GOP CONGRESS, THE MILLIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT VOTED FOR DONALD  J. TRUMP….

AND, AS A CONCERNED AMERICAN GRANDMOTHER, I CARE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF MY GRAND CHILDREN. 

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AND… THE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM. ACCORDINGLY, INFORMATION REGARDING IRAN, SUDAN, AND SYRIA CAN BE FOUND IN CHAPTER 3, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM.

Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview

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snippets ON TERRORIST SANCTUARY COUNTRY’S

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THESE AREAS ALLOWED THE GROUP’S OPERATIVES TO CONTINUE EXPLOITING THE POROUS BORDER REGIONS

THE LACK OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL ACROSS LARGE PORTIONS OF ITS TERRITORY AND POROUS BORDERS MAKES PREVENTING THE FLOW VERY DIFFICULT.

THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION MANAGED TO ESTABLISH NEW SAFE HAVENS FROM WHERE IT PLANNED AND LAUNCHED ATTACKS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMISOM BASES, AND SOFT TARGETS IN KENYA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE REGION.

THE EXPANSE REMAINED DIFFICULT TO CONTROL. SURVEILLANCE IMPROVED BUT REMAINED PARTIAL AT BEST, AND TRADITIONAL SMUGGLING AND PIRACY GROUPS HAVE PROVIDED AN EFFECTIVE COVER FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, AND FUNDS. KIDNAPPINGS FOR RANSOM REMAINED AN ONGOING THREAT.

THERE ARE UNGOVERNED, UNDER-GOVERNED, AND ILL-GOVERNED AREAS  THAT TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE USED TO ORGANIZE, PLAN, RAISE FUNDS, COMMUNICATE, RECRUIT, TRAIN, AND OPERATE IN RELATIVE SECURITY

THESE AREAS ALLOWED THE GROUP’S OPERATIVES TO CONTINUE EXPLOITING THE POROUS BORDER REGIONS BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA AND LAUNCH DEADLY CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS.

SOUTHEAST ASIA IS VULNERABLE TO EXPLOITATION BY ILLICIT TRAFFICKERS AND PROLIFERATORS GIVEN THE HIGH VOLUME OF GLOBAL TRADE TRANSITING THE REGION AS WELL AS THE EXISTENCE OF SMUGGLING AND PROLIFERATION NETWORKS. WEAK STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS, LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS, INADEQUATE MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY CAPABILITIES

2015, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO MONITOR AND INVESTIGATE GROUPS ENGAGED IN OR SUPPORTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT VIEWS TERRORISM AS ONE OF THE COUNTRY’S GREATEST THREATS

THE NORTHERN SINAI WAS CLOSED OFF TO TOURISTS, JOURNALISTS, U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND NGOS IN 2015.

ISIL-SP HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INCREASINGLY FREQUENT AND SOPHISTICATED TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST EGYPTIAN FORCES

ISIL USED THE TERRITORY UNDER ITS CONTROL IN 2015 TO PRODUCE SULFUR MUSTARD AND IEDS FILLED WITH CHLORINE

DUE TO SECURITY CONDITIONS IN IRAQ, THE EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY (EXBS) PROGRAM HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IMPLEMENTING OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.

THE GOVERNMENT TOOK NO ACTION IN 2015 TO DISARM HIZBALLAH, TO ELIMINATE ITS SAFE HAVENS WITHIN LEBANESE TERRITORY, OR TO PREVENT THE FLOW OF HIZBALLAH MEMBERS TO SYRIA OR IRAQ. UNGOVERNED AREAS ALONG THE UN-DEMARCATED LEBANESE-SYRIAN BORDER ALSO SERVED AS SAFE HAVENS FOR NUSRAH FRONT, THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT, AND OTHER SUNNI TERRORIST GROUPS IN 2015, WHICH OPERATE IN MOUNTAINOUS, MOSTLY UNINHABITED ZONES WHERE THE GOVERNMENT HAS LIMITED REACH.

ITS POROUS BORDERS MAKE THE COUNTRY VULNERABLE FOR USE AS A TRANSIT AND TRANSSHIPMENT HUB FOR PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE TRANSFERS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA

LIBYA’S POROUS BORDERS, FRAGMENTED SECURITY FORCES, AND VAST UNGOVERNED TERRITORY HAVE MADE IT A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS such as Ansar al-Shari’a Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a Darnah, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Due to the inability of the Libyan government to effectively administer its territory, terrorist organizations have found safe havens primarily in Sirte, Darnah, Benghazi, and Sabratha, although violent extremist groups operate with impunity throughout Libya

THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS IN LIBYA IN 2015, AND HAS BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT FLOWS OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN AND OUT OF ITS TERRITORY. TERRORIST TRAINING CAMPS AND FACILITATION NETWORKS EXIST THROUGHOUT LIBYA; LOCAL TRIBES AND MINORITY GROUPS FREQUENTLY SERVE AS FACILITATORS

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS ARE BEGINNING TO RETURN TO LIBYA OR CHOOSING TO STAY IN LIBYA TO FIGHT THERE, INCREASING CONCERNS THAT LIBYA HAS BECOME A BATTLEFIELD FOR VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS SUCH AS ISIL.

YEMEN. THROUGHOUT 2015, AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP) AND ISIL-YEMEN EXPLOITED THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY VACUUM TO STRENGTHEN THEIR FOOTHOLD AND EXPAND RECRUITING INSIDE THE COUNTRY.

COLOMBIA, ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS, PRIMARILY KNOWN AS “BANDAS CRIMINALES,” CONTINUED TO USE THE “POROUS BORDER”, REMOTE MOUNTAIN AREAS, AND JUNGLES TO MANEUVER, TRAIN, CULTIVATE AND TRANSPORT NARCOTICS, OPERATE ILLEGAL MINES, “TAX” THE LOCAL POPULACE, AND ENGAGE IN OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

VENEZUELA’S “POROUS BORDER” WITH COLOMBIA HAS MADE THE COUNTRY ATTRACTIVE TO THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY, WHO USE IT TO TRANSIT IN AND OUT OF ITS TERRITORY. THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS THAT VENEZUELA MAINTAINED A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT THAT ALLOWED FOR SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES THAT BENEFITED KNOWN TERRORIST GROUPS.

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 WHO KNEW, KNOWS AND CARES? ABOUT”INDIGENOUS NATIVES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS “EXTENDING OR OPERATING ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES”? 

 WHO KNEW, KNOWS AND CARES? ABOUT THE POROUS BORDERS, THE TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS, AKA “TERRORIST SANCTUARY” THAT THREATEN THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF AMERICA’S HOMELAND

PRESIDENT DONALD. J. TRUMP, HIS APPOINTEES , THE GOP CONGRESS,

THE MILLIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT VOTED FOR DONALD  J. TRUMP….

AND, AS A CONCERNED AMERICAN GRANDMOTHER, I CARE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF MY GRAND CHILDREN. 

Chapters

Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment
Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview
Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
Chapter 4: The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)
Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

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